The democracy of European fiscal consolidation: reform governments in Greece, Ireland and Italy by Pipal, Christian
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
European College 
 
 
 
Master Thesis 
 
 
 
 
Christian Pipal 
 
 
 
The Democracy of European Fiscal Consolidation: 
Reform Governments in Greece, Ireland and Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisors: Prof. Vello Andres Pettai, PhD & Stefano Braghiroli, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2015 
 
I have written the Master’s thesis independently.  
All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of 
literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.  
 
.........................................................................  
(Signature of the author and date)  
 
Student’s code  B35267 
 
 
The defence takes place: ……………, 2015 in Tartu, Estonia  
Opponent: Prof. Nico Groenendijk 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
Are technocratic governments the reformers of last resort? And why are they appointed? 
Facing the ongoing European debt crisis, some countries choose to put technocrats into 
reform government offices, while others are able to reform their markets and fiscal 
structure within regularly elected governments. What differentiates these technocratic 
from non-technocratic governments in terms of origins and reform efforts? And are 
technocratic government compositions more able to implement complex market and 
fiscal reforms in a short period of time when facing difficult institutional settings? In 
order to answer these questions, this research follows an institutional approach along 
rational choice theory and the concept of varieties of capitalism. A comparative study of 
the political economy of Greece, Ireland and Italy examines the different underpinnings 
that build-up to these reform governments and shows how reform efforts and forms of 
reform governments, understood as being either partisan or non-partisan composed, 
vary between different varieties of capitalism. The findings provides evidence that the 
varieties of capitalism configuration, and the embedded features of economic and 
political institutions, influence the incentives for counties to appoint technocratic 
governments when facing an economic crisis, thus advancing an existing model that 
describes the likelihood of  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
During the European debt crisis some countries appointed non-party-affiliated experts, 
so called technocrats, to government offices as seen in Greece (Papademos) and Italy 
(Monti). Both cabinets faced the task to implement hard fiscal and market reforms. This 
can be viewed as a move endangering the concept of democracy (Hopkin, 2012b), as 
“Technocratic styles of policy making pose a threat to democracy, because decisions are 
not subjected to the public scrutiny and dynamics of bargaining that are at the heart of 
democratic politics” (Bangura, 2004, p. 1). Although it seems plausible at a first glance 
to appoint outside experts in order to implement different reforms, the bigger picture 
questions this need for technocratic governments as we can see countries like Ireland 
where the regularly elected governments imposed market reforms (European 
Commission, 2014b). This leads to two main puzzles: First, why is it in general hard for 
governments to impose tight fiscal policy in order to reduce their public debt? Second, 
focusing on the ongoing European debt crisis and looking at the instalment of 
technocratic governments in some European countries, why do some countries choose 
to put external people into reform government offices, while others are able to reform 
their markets and fiscal structure within regular governments?  
This thesis lies therefore at the intersection of two literature strands, which 
approach the issue of government responses to economic crises from very different 
directions. Whereas one strand - by far the most popular one - covers the economic 
factors that constitute the European debt crisis, the other strand deals with technocratic 
governments as observed in Greece or Italy. This paper tries to combine both strands to 
form a coherent interest group theory which advances the existing model of technocratic 
likelihood, and explains why technocratic governments only occur in certain countries 
when facing pressures for fiscal adjustment. 
This research paper is structured as follows: chapter two reviews the existing 
literature on the concepts that constitute the nuts and bolts of this analysis - namely 
research on the origins and features of the European debt crisis by looking at the 
European paradigm of economic policy making and institutional explanations of the 
crisis, as well as covering the scholarly discussion about technocratic governments - and 
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gives background information that will be used to develop a methodology in order to 
answer the just stated research puzzles.  
The outlined methodological approach in chapter three focuses therefore on the 
effect of institutional political economy on governmental efforts to reform their fiscal 
policy under external pressures in connection to their composition (partisan or non-
partisan). By combining the varieties of capitalism framework (VOC) with the reviewed 
technocracy likelihood model, an additional variable that represents the VOC setup of a 
country, thus advancing the economic crisis parameter of the model, is presented to be 
included. Chapter 4 covers the empirical assessment and justification for the inclusion 
of that variable by conducting a comparative case study of three countries which were 
hit severely by the crisis and experienced large pressure for reform (Greece, Ireland and 
Italy). The findings indeed highlight the importance of including the mentioned setup 
when analysing the occurrence of technocratic governments. The findings go in line 
with one of the main VOC assumptions that backlashes are more likely in countries 
where policy reforms attempt to change the existing VOC setup. The final chapter is 
dedicated to a conclusion that points out the need for explanations how economic crises 
are transformed into incentives for countries to appoint technocratic cabinets and how 
the proposed advancements can be further developed in future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
 
The discussion of technocratic policy making during the European debt crisis hasn’t 
received much scholarly attention yet, and even the question what makes a government 
technocratic was only addressed very recently. McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014) define 
the ideal type of technocratic governments as a situation where major governmental 
decisions are not made by elected party officials, policy is not decided within parties 
and the highest officials are not recruited through the party. They identify 24 technocrat-
led governments in the post World War II era (out of over 600 government 
compositions) in the 27 EU member states, thus showing that technocratic governments 
are rare events. However, their research does not go much beyond a comprehensive 
definition of technocratic governments, and the occurrence of such governments in the 
EU during the recent decade is understudied. Existing scholarly works (including works 
in progress) have either a different geographical focus (Kaplan, 2014), focus on single 
countries (Culpepper, 2014) or leave the institutional setup of the domestic economy 
aside by focusing on the party system itself (Pastorella, 2014a, 2014c). This study will 
close this gap by adopting a comparative approach which focuses on the political 
economy of the examined countries.  
Whereas the connection between technocratic governments and their economic 
institutional underpinning is an understudied field, the role of interest groups and 
domestic institutional setups within a country’s economy itself that define the extent to 
which governments can set policy goals and priorities, is well studied (Alesina & 
Drazen, 1991; Drazen & Grilli, 1993; Persson, 1998; Persson & Tabellini, 2002; 
Rodrik, 1996). How the appointment of technocratic governments is influenced by these 
factors is the core of this study.  
Beyond assumptions about incumbent governments and their attempts to being 
re-elected and common pool considerations, the institutional set-up of a country’s 
economy influences the easiness of implementing fiscal adjustments. The typology used 
in this thesis follows the concept of “Varieties of Capitalism” proposed by Hall and 
Soskice (2001). In a nutshell it says that there can be two perfect versions of a market 
economy that lead to a high level of well-being, but have a very different internal 
structure. Mixed market economies expand this originally dichotomous model and 
 10   
 
opens it up for the inclusion of Mediterranean countries. One of the findings is that 
liberal market economies have an easier task in adopting restrictive fiscal policies than 
coordinated market economies, and therefore also mixed market economies as they can 
be seen as a subgroup of coordinate market economies (Molina & Rhodes, 2007; 
Soskice, 2008). 
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2.1 An overview of the European debt crisis 
 
2.1.1 Paradigms of European economic policy  
 
Before outlining the elements that constitute the current European debt crisis, it is 
beneficial to take a step back and ask why it is hard for governments to enact fiscal 
reforms in general, even without the presence of a severe economic or debt crisis, thus 
leading to situations of debt to GDP (Gross Domestic Product) levels that are too high 
to be dealt with without severe consequences, as fiscal imprudence  severely hampers 
the long-run economic health of an economy (Evans, Kotlikoff, & Phillips, 2013; 
Herndon, Ash, & Pollin, 2013). Already a quick look on the economic policies that 
European countries followed after the Second World War (or since they become 
independent capitalist countries) shows that they followed the paradigm of Keynesian 
economics, with the notable exception of Estonia1. Keynesian economics, in a nutshell, 
represents the idea that the business cycle of the economy, the wave form oscillations of 
up- and downturns of the national economy in terms of GDP representing the outcome 
of the aggregate demand and supply (Burns & Mitchell, 1946), has to be addressed by 
the government in an proactive and countercyclical manner, meaning that the 
government should invest in the economy in times of busts in order to raise national 
aggregate demand, and save surpluses in times of economic booms (Keynes, 1923), and 
it should therefore be possible to see overall balanced budgets in the long run, but 
official figures show that this concept was never entirely followed by European decision 
makers as national debt to GDP ratios rose constantly during the last decades, usually 
following the premise of running smaller deficits in boom times and larger deficits in 
times of recession. Figure 1 illustrates this development on the next page. 
 
 
                                                 
1 One could also mention Liechtenstein as an exception to this general European trend, but due to its size 
and economic structure, namely the large share of the banking sector, it is hardly comparable to the rest of 
the European countries 
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Figure 1: Historical development of public debt in % of GDP. 
Source: Lane (2012), based on IMF Public Debt Database 
 
2.1.2 The long-run accumulation of public debt 
 
As already stated, taking on public debt is not necessarily a bad thing, and there are 
arguments why it can be even a positive thing to do. Besides the mentioned 
smoothening of the business cycle of the national economy, it is only logical that certain 
government expenditures, for instance for large infrastructure projects, cannot be 
financed from the regular annual budget. The problem with unsustainable debt only 
starts when it accumulates in the long run, thus growing permanently faster than a 
country’s GDP. Kirchgässner (2014) points out different approaches that explain why 
public debt levels tend to increase in the long run. 
First, individual wellbeing, as perceived by the citizens and influenced by a 
government’s economic policy, gives incentives for office holders to increase their re-
election chances by using economic policy. Most of the literature that investigates this 
connection is centred on the question if incumbent governments benefit from deficit 
spending, starting with the idea of opportunistic political business cycles (OPBC), a 
 13   
 
model that connects the opportunistic behaviour of politicians and their economic 
policy, as developed by Nordhaus (1975) and advanced by Persson and Tabellini (1990) 
and Rogoff (1990). If this assumption was true, we would be able to identify a pattern 
of public spending during pre-election times, but as studies by Alesina, Cohen, and 
Roubini (1992) as well as Faust and Irons (1999) show, no such pattern can be 
identified. In contrast, they show that the political business cycle (PBC) is not mainly 
determined by the actions of opportunistic politicians who use loose fiscal policy to 
increase their chances for re-election, but by ideological differences between parties and 
their policy preferences (partisanship), and show strong partisan effects. On the flip 
side, not much scholarly work has been done regarding the question if voters punish 
governments that tighten their fiscal policy (instead of being rewarded for deficit 
spending), but the  few  authors who  analyse  the  electoral  feasibility  of PBAs dispute 
that  governments  which reduce deficits are voted out of office (Alesina, Carloni, & 
Lecce, 2010, 2011; Alesina, Perotti, Tavares, Obstfeld, & Eichengreen, 1998; Brender 
& Drazen, 2008; Buti, Turrini, Noord, & Biroli, 2009) and Alesina et. al. note that they 
“found no evidence that even large reductions of budget deficits are associated always 
(or most of the times) with electoral losses” (Alesina et al., 2011, p. 15).  
The second strand focuses on the role of conflicts between interest groups and 
those responsible for budgetary decisions. The more unequal the distribution of the 
expected costs of adjustment is, the longer it will take for reform measures to happen. 
As polarization is connected to the distance  between parties in terms of ideology 
(Sartori, 1976), majoritarian countries are expected to be less polarized than consensus-
based countries and thus experience adjustments earlier. This is in line with the 
assumption that a majoritarian electoral design favours two-party systems. Concluding, 
the incentive to wait for the others to concede is larger in proportional representation 
systems. Alesina and Drazen (1991) point out that stabilizations happen later in 
countries with lower political cohesion and a higher number of parties in a cabinet. 
Empirical assessments, for instance by  Alesina et al. (1998), confirm that countries 
with less political cohesion and proportional election systems run higher budget deficits.  
A third approach identifies a common pool problem, similar to the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin, 1968), where the different interest groups focus only on their share 
 14   
 
of the budget, but don’t take the overall budget into account, thus leading to a long run 
accumulation of debt (Kirchgässner, 2014).  
2.1.3 The European debt crisis: a more complex story. 
 
Given the fact that almost all countries in the EU accumulated high debt level during the 
last decades, but only some of them are facing a severe debt crisis, it becomes clear that 
the story of the European debt crisis must be more complex than just being an outcome 
of the earlier described factors that make borrowing easier for governments than saving. 
This subchapter shall thus give a brief overview about the multiple factors that 
contributed to the current crisis. First of all, the root of the crisis lies at the foundation 
and setup of the European Monetary Union (EMU) itself, as it provided benefits, 
especially in terms of low interest rates, to all members despite their given economic 
asymmetries. By looking at the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory (Baldwin & 
Wyplosz, 2009) and its criteria (labour mobility, production diversification, openness, 
financial transfers, homogeneity of preferences and solidarity), it is obvious that the 
EMU does not form an OCA, as it only fully fulfils the criteria of openness and product 
diversification. Drawing from the OCA theory, it is also clear that an economic shock 
would hit the EMU members asymmetrically. Assuming that these flaws of the currency 
union were unknown by the creators of the EMU would be of course wrong, and the 
convergence of economic policies among EMU members was one of the central goals. 
The Stability and Growth Pact  (SGP) was intended to provide stability to the fiscal 
development of the Eurozone by preventing countries from taking on too much debt as 
a consequence of the strong currency2. The general set-up of the pact at the time the 
Eurozone was created aimed at ensuring that the members of the currency union would 
be bound to follow strict rules of running public debt, thus limiting the risk the 
Eurozone would suffer as a whole if one country ran excessive public debt. The logic 
behind this is that if one country runs large debt, this will threat the stability of the 
financial markets, thus leading to higher interest rates for the other countries as well, no 
matter if their debt is low or high. One of the key rules was that no country would be 
                                                 
2 The at this point presented argument why the SGP could not have prevent the European debt crisis in all 
countries was already presented by the author in another paper, “No EMU without EFU? Advantages and 
risks of a European fiscal policy”, prepared for the course “Economic integration in Europe” with Dr. 
Andrew Rozeik during the spring term 2014. 
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allowed to accumulate too high debts, the ceiling was set at 60 per cent of the GDP. 
Other regulations, such as rules regarding the annual budget deficits, which had also 
been part of the convergence criteria, have been stressed again. These regulations were 
extended in the last years, notably by the “Euro-plus-pact” and the Fiscal Compact. This 
provided some conditionality to countries that intended to adopt the common currency, 
and although countries reformed their fiscal structures when joining the EMU, most 
targets set by the SGP were not reached. Nevertheless, countries were still accepted to 
join the EMU although they did not meet the requirements (Lane, 2012). 
With regard to the recent years it can be argued that this set-up was not efficient. First, 
the rules stated in the Stability and Growth Pact were never enforced, which was visible 
when France and Germany violated these rules but prevented any sanctions. Second, 
even if the rules were actually enforceable, Fuest and Peichl (2012) argue that the 
ongoing debt crisis could not have been prevented: (1) Financial sanctions would have 
worsened the situation of the countries which are already suffering from high debts, and 
(2) these rules did not cover the reality of the situation in countries like Ireland or Spain. 
These countries had only comparably low public debts running for years when they 
were hit by recession, either by the burst of a real estate bubble or a banking crisis. 
Fuest and Peichl (2012) come to the conclusion that even good national fiscal policy 
cannot prevent a country from running high debt in such conditions.  
Another, not less important, feature that contributed to the current crisis are 
institutional factors that create different levels of competitiveness, unveiling the 
problems that the Southern European countries faced when put together under one 
currency umbrella together with Northern countries. Hall (2014) points out that the 
Northern countries were in a good position to take advantage of the new situation as 
they could easily continue to follow their export strategies and were even benefiting 
from the elimination of the exchange rate risk. Further they benefited from lower 
competition on the international markets as the Southern European countries were no 
longer able to offer their goods cheaper by devaluating their national currencies. 
Together with strong government efforts to limit the increase of wage rates, the 
Northern countries were able to increase their competitiveness largely and started to 
build up large balance-of-payment surpluses. However, the story was different for 
Southern European countries. Although their accession to the Eurozone also eliminated 
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their exchange rate risks, the overall effect on the countries’ strategies was negative as 
their demand led strategy could not work any longer without the tool of devaluation 
(which is especially difficult if a country’s goods are of a lower quality than those of its 
competitors). Nevertheless, the country decided to follow its old approach against all 
odds (this time domestically) as the increased trust in national bonds (due to the 
integration into the Eurozone) lowered the interest rates for financing on the 
international markets on an all-time low, thus starting the downwards spiral of large 
financial flows from banks from Northern countries, although the accumulation of large 
debt was not entirely the fault of the government alone or a result of excessive deficit 
spending but was the starting point of a very slippery slope as Hall (2014) notes  
“Thus, even when the governments of the south did not adopt an expansionary 
fiscal stance, cheap credit fuelled the expansion of domestic demand. The effects 
were predictable, if largely unpredicted. With expansion came inflation, which 
took prices and relative unit labour costs in the south to new heights. Unable to 
devalue in order to offset the effect of such developments, those countries saw 
their current-account balances deteriorate as their products became less 
competitive on world markets, just as competition from the emerging economies 
of Asia and Eastern Europe intensified. In principle, the ECB could have used its 
monetary instruments to reduce rates of inflation in southern Europe, but doing 
so would have risked contraction in the north, where real interest rates were 
already higher. Instead, the ECB kept its eye on German wage settlements, 
which set the pattern for agreements in many other parts of northern Europe. 
The rest, as they say, is history. When the American bubble burst, shaking 
confidence in global financial markets, investors in European bonds became 
alarmed by the levels of debt present in Europe and were more reluctant to fund 
southern European firms and governments, even in countries with public sector 
deficits and debt lower than those of apparently creditworthy neighbours. For 
five years, the European Union has been trying to find a way to restore 
confidence in the financial markets and to find a route out of the deep recession 
experienced on its periphery.” 
(Hall, 2014, p. 1228f.) 
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2.1.4 Institutions, varieties of capitalism, and the European debt crisis 
 
As politicians do not carry out their policies in some vacuum with no connection to the 
structures they are imbedded in, including the institutional characteristics of a country in 
the analysis will be beneficial. These can be understood as mediating factors that alter 
and shape the actions of political actors when assuming that reform pressure is followed 
by reform actions by the government. One analytical framework to characterise the 
political economic institutional setup of a country is the VOC approach as developed by 
Hall and Soskice (2001). The idea of categorising capitalist economies goes back to the 
1960s and the work of Shonfield (1965), and was developed further by various scholars 
(Katzenstein, 1978; Nordlinger (1981); Skocpol and Amenta (1986)). The VOC 
approach in particular draws on previous work by Esping-Andersen (1990) that focused 
on different models of social welfare regimes, defining and grouping them into three 
categories, namely conservative, liberal and democratic welfare regimes. He argues that 
these characteristics influence reform processes, and the fight between winners and 
losers of such reforms makes them considerably difficult.  
 Hall and Soskice (2001) advanced this approach by including a wider range of 
characteristics than previously used, resulting in the VOC approach which sees many 
actors such as governments, individuals or firms trying to influence decision making 
and promoting their self-interests. The centre of their analysis are firms which are 
considered to be the main actors to create welfare (by generating economic output). 
They face a range of coordination problems (such as inter-firm relations, employee 
relations, or training and education coordination to name a few), and the way they solve 
these problems constitutes the framework for their analysis: based on these coordination 
strategies they group western capitalist economies into two categories, namely liberal 
market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies as shown in table 1 (see 
next page).  
When grouping countries into these two categories it is obvious that LMEs are 
prevalent in countries that developed from Anglo-Saxon traditions (such as the United 
States or the United Kingdom), whereas CMEs are strongly connected to Central 
European and Nordic countries. These two ideal types formulate alternative equilibria 
for market economies which both lead to equally high welfare. It is worth noticing at 
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this point that neither of the two is considered to be superior to the other as both models 
have a comparative advantage in different areas of production and attract different kinds 
of skill acquisitions by employees. This follows the idea that CMEs focus on long term 
relationships between firms, employees and the governments whereas LMEs are 
connected with rapidly changing and innovative market relations. Therefore CMEs have 
a comparative advantage in complex industrial products that require incremental 
innovation (such as German cars) and employees tend to invest their assets in firm 
specific skills that require long term training, whereas LMEs have their advantage in the 
production of goods that require radical, quick and risky innovation (such as American 
software products) and employees usually invest into switchable skills that make them 
employable across the entire sector.  
 
Table 1: Institutional differences between LMEs and CMEs. 
 LMEs CMEs 
Corporate governance (a) high stock market 
capitalisation 
(b) short-term capital 
predominant 
(a) credit/bank-based 
financing 
(b) focus on long-term 
capital 
Industrial relations (a) low union membership 
(b) limited employers’ 
coordination 
(c) decentralised wage 
bargaining & low 
coverage of wage 
agreements 
(d) social dialogue missing 
(a) high union membership 
(b) high membership rates in 
employers’ associations 
(c) centralised wage 
bargaining & high 
coverage of wage 
agreements 
(d) strong social dialogue 
Inter-firm relations (a) based on hierarchy and 
competition 
(a) based on relations and 
networks 
Employee relations (a) shorter job tenure (a) longer job tenure 
Training and education (a) focus on general skills (a) specific skills, strong 
vocational training 
Source: Hall and Soskice (2001) 
 
Based on this framework of analysis, Hall and Soskice (2001) try to find an answer to 
the widely discussed question if globalization (as well as European integration) lead to a 
convergence of institutional and economic national characteristics. They conclude that 
such a convergence is not likely to happen as both types have a comparative advantage 
and can perfectly coexist with each other (they in fact need each other as no VOC can 
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produce all goods necessary effectively and a convergence would reduce the overall 
output).  Besides their main conclusion, another aspect of their work is of particular 
interest for this thesis research: as both VOCs lead to high levels of well-being, they 
assume that globalization processes that move a country away from its VOC setup 
increase the likelihood of political backlashes.  
However, their approach is not without critique. Blyth (2003) criticises the 
model’s heavy reliance on quantifiable data making it too static to reflect reality. This 
criticism is shared by Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher (2008) who see the path-
dependence aspect of the VOC model  as too static to allow for economic and 
institutional change. They also criticise that the model neglects the role of conflicts as a 
result of actors struggling over individual gains, thus making the model apolitical. This 
latter criticism has to be seen as baseless as Hall and Soskice (2001) take into account 
the political conflict when moving away from a country’s equilibrium point. More 
useful for the purpose of this research is critique that is focused on the dichotomy of the 
VOC model (see for instance Hoffmann (2003)), not only because dividing market 
economies in two groups seems to be overly simplifying, but also because it is nearly 
impossible to put Southern European economies into either of the two legibly3.  
A useful advancement of the VOC was developed by Becker (2009) who tackled 
this problem by expanding the model in order to include countries that empirically do 
not fit well into the original two categories and divides market economies into four 
categories: liberal, statist, corporatist and meso-communitarian capitalism. He also 
opened the model for a subtype with large prevalence clientelist behaviour which is 
mainly present in Mediterranean countries (including Greece, but as we will see in the 
later analysis also liberal countries such as Ireland show clientelist preferences). He 
further opens up the rather static original VOC model and puts emphasis on the process 
of institutional change, thus making the overall model more fluid. This does not mean 
that countries can change their VOC setup easily or quickly as a struggle between 
different actors around actions, routines and consequences may as well prevent change. 
Further useful advancement can be found in the work of Soskice (2008) who expands 
the approach to include fiscal policy choices, finding that LMEs face an easier task 
                                                 
3 They are usually characterised as CMEs, but already a look at their overall economic performance 
shows that their economies are far away from their equilibrium point, thus being less competitive (Molina 
& Rhodes, 2007) 
 20   
 
when making policy decisions than CMEs, as LMEs are more flexible as they don’t 
need to handle the influence of collective bargainers on government spending or cutting. 
The reason for this is that in CMEs policy making is usually done by a broad national 
consensus which includes many actors, thus leading to a problem of common pooling: 
One actor or a group of actors benefits from a certain policy choice, but the costs are 
shared between the entireness of actors. Further, and this will be of utmost importance 
when analysing the investigated countries in this research, CMEs (and also their 
Mediterranean subgroup) face the presence of powerful unions and representative 
interest groups  when dealing with issues such as wage bargainings and industrial 
relations. As measures that lower wages are an important part of fiscal consolidation 
(Alesina, 2012), the consensus style of industrial and industry to government relations 
in CMEs make it difficult to reach such agreements, thus making it more difficult to 
implement fiscal consolidations measures.  
 
2.1.5 Southern European economies and the Varieties of Capitalism approach 
 
When trying to put the countries of Southern Europe into one of the two categories of 
the original VOC model, one faces severe difficulties as neither of the two groups suits 
an empirical assessment of these countries. Therefore these countries are often seen as 
outliers, exceptions within the VOC approach (Featherstone, 2008). By picking up on 
the ideas outlined in the previous subchapter and the inclusion of a third category, 
namely mixed market economies (MME), in the VOC model, the work of Molina and 
Rhodes (2007) creates a framework that suits countries like Greece or Italy (in fact all 
the Mediterranean countries) much better (see table 2 on page 22). The characterisation 
of Southern European countries as MMEs, as used in this thesis, draws heavily on the 
work by Blavoukos and Pagoulatos (2010), Hassel (2014) and Molina and Rhodes 
(2007). As Hassel (2014) states, MMEs can be seen as a subgroup of CMEs,  
“[..]in the sense that the economic actors, trade unions and business 
organizations have similar organizational features to CMEs. They often hold 
monopolies, or quasi monopolies, over membership domains and have 
privileged access to state resources. However, political and economic actors 
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do not have similar coordinating capacities as CMEs nor do they use these 
capacities for autonomous coordination. Rather, organized interests use their 
resources to lobby the state for protection or compensation.” 
(Hassel, 2014, p. 7) 
In contrast to CME countries, there is no well-established system social partnerships to 
negotiate the terms of industrial relations and unions, and a range of interest groups tries 
to promote their own interests, while being often connected to political parties. Given 
the fragmented nature of interest representation (fragmented both along power as well 
as businesses), thus not creating a central point for coordination and negotiation, leading 
to different levels of social protection between employees in the private sector and those 
employed in the public sector (where the level of security is higher for public sector 
employees) and between the different kinds of private businesses (where usually the 
security level is higher for employees of large, formally public, firms).  
Summing up, the Southern European economies should not be seen as outliers 
that don’t not fit into the VOC model and left aside, a strategy surprisingly prevalent in 
academic discussion. Instead, the classification of countries like Greece or Italy as a 
MMEs, which can be seen as a subgroup from CMEs, benefits the analysis. Clientelism 
and the fragmentation of industrial coordination lead to a system where measures of 
protection, labour regulation and welfare exist dually. While some groups of actors 
enjoy high levels of protection and welfare (usually in the public sector as well as 
previously state owned firms), others do not enjoy these benefits and are most 
vulnerable when it comes to paying the costs associated with fiscal reform measures and 
austerity. In addition, widespread clientelism increases this unequal distribution of 
benefits as well as burden sharing (Featherstone, 2008, p. 10). 
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Table 2: Institutional differences between the three varieties of capitalism. 
 CMEs LMEs MMEs 
Dominant form of 
coordination of 
micro interactions 
Autonomous 
coordination 
Market, arms’-
length interactions 
Mixed (autonomous + 
market) with a higher 
impact of regulation and 
state mediation 
Source of 
complementarities 
Bottom-up induced Market-induced 
coherence across 
policy areas 
State regulatory changes 
aimed at correcting 
coordination failures 
may be dysfunctional 
Re-enforcing 
mechanisms 
(mechanisms of 
stability) 
High permeability of 
political system to 
domestic coalitions 
High penetration of 
policymaking by 
exogenous 
economic forces 
Gate-keeping role of the 
state: veto power of 
domestic actors 
The horizons Long-term Short-term State regulation may 
perpetuate long-term 
inefficient equilibirums 
Investment in 
specific assets 
High Low  Medium-low 
Organizational 
characteristics of 
interest 
associations 
(a) Employers: 
strong and well 
organised in 
sectors  
(a) Employers: 
fragmented 
(a) Employers: 
fragmented 
 (b) Unions: 
politically strong 
and well- 
articulated 
organisations 
 
(b) Unions: strong 
firm-level, but 
fragmented 
politically weak 
(b) Unions: politically 
strong but 
fragmented and 
weakly articulated 
Role of the state Enabling: protects 
collective goods 
Minimum state: 
guarantees the 
effective 
functioning of the 
market 
Pervasive state. Direct 
production and 
regulation + correction 
of coordination failures 
Expected reform 
coalitions 
Cross-class Producer groups, 
multinational 
industrial, and 
financial groups 
Class-conflict, 
fragmented cross-class 
coalitions (sectorial 
reform coalitions) 
Source: Molina and Rhodes (2007) 
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2.2 Technocratic crisis governments 
 
Whereas the mechanisms of the European debt crisis, as well as the preceding financial 
crisis, and the policies connected to them are widely discussed topics in academic 
analysis and debate, the high number of technocratic governments since 2007 (a 
comprehensive list of technocratic governments in Europe will be presented later in this 
text) received surprisingly little scholarly attention that goes beyond a superficial 
condemning as being a threat to democracy (Bangura, 2004; Hopkin, 2012b; Kramer, 
2011). Further, most of the research regarding the democratic accountability of the 
policies in response to the European debt crisis and European economic governance in 
general focus on the supra-national level and the transfer of competences to European 
institutions that are not subjected to democratic control (Habermas, 2011a, 2011b; 
Scharpf, 2011, 2012, 2013). As technocratic governments are rare events in liberal 
democracies, their heaped occurrence since the peak of the crisis deserves a closer 
investigation, especially considering the often stated proposition that they are a foreign 
imposed threat to  European democracies, a claim particularly popular outside of the 
formal academic discussion (BBC, 2011; Die Zeit, 2011; Hopkin, 2012b; McDonnell, 
2013; Schmidt, 2011) . Without a closer look at these national governments, questions 
regarding their potential impact on democratic accountability and mechanisms of 
occurrence remain unanswered, the usage of the term technocracy vague, and 
arguments challenging its negative connotations unheard.  
 
2.2.1 What makes a government technocratic? 
 
Before asking questions such as “How many technocrats does it take to make a 
technocratic government?” (McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014, p. 654), it is beneficial to 
trace the term technocracy back to its origins in Plato’s central work The Republic, 
referring to the rule of the wisest people (in this case philosophers), as only they have a 
clear view on the true reality. This elite ruling can of course be seen as being contraire 
to our modern understanding of liberal democracies. By transferring this idea bluntly to 
the modern era, technocracy can be understood as the rule of people who are experts in 
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their respective fields, may it be economics, science or others, contrasting the idea of 
rule by politicians, or in very simple terms, central bankers versus party people. 
The work of McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014) offers a useful introduction to the 
discussion of technocratic governments in the European Union by flipping the 
parameters that describe the opposite of a technocratic government, namely a party 
government (Katz, 1987), and define three necessary conditions for an ideal type 
technocratic government: “(1) All major governmental decisions are not made by 
elected party officials. (2) Policy is not decided within parties which then act cohesively 
to enact it. (3) The highest officials (ministers, prime ministers) are not recruited 
through party” (McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014, p. 656). They identify 24 technocrat-led 
governments in the post World War II era in the 27 EU member states, which vary by 
the degree of technocracy,  from technocrat-led governments with majority of party 
representatives to cabinets where no office is held by a party nominated person, and 
they find that fully technocratic governments are extremely rare. However, their 
research does not go much beyond a comprehensive definition of technocratic 
governance and their definition of a technocratic governments is only one among 
several others (Hallerberg & Wehner, 2013; Neto & Lobo, 2009; Tucker et al., 2000), 
but their classification and framework is the sole exception that has a distinctive cross-
country approach that does not focus on a single policy area. Their definition is 
criticised to some degree by Culpepper (2014) who does not view the 2011 cabinet of 
Papademos in Greece as technocratic (contraire to popular media claims as it consisted 
of ministers from the long established parties and was only headed by a technocratic 
prime minister, thus rejecting the idea of including technocratic-led governments in a 
technocracy framework. But why shouldn’t partisan governments, that broadly support 
a technocratic prime minister, thus creating a government of unity, be viewed as a 
technocratic one? Pastorella (2014c) points out the importance of government’s claims 
in terms of being independent experts, neutral vis-à-vis political parties and value-
neutral when classifying technocratic governments, as well as the need for being 
recognized as a technocratic government by the media. Therefore her classification of 
technocratic governments in the post World War II era in the European Union accounts 
for a larger number than the one stated by McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014), identifying 
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31 technocratic governments between 1945 and 2014 as shown in table 24. For the 
purpose of this paper her classification has considerable advantages as it allows to 
create a dichotomous variable for the occurrence of technocratic governments and its 
emphasis on claims being technocratic, thus connecting the analysis better to the 
popular debate around technocratic governments which takes place mainly within 
popular media. 
Table 3: Technocratic Governments in the EU Member States, 1945 – 2014. 
 Country Prime Minister Start Year End Year 
1 Bulgaria Popov 1990 1991 
2 Bulgaria Berov 1992 1994 
3 Bulgaria Indzhova 1994 1994 
4 Bulgaria Raykov 2013 2013 
5 Czech Republic Tosovsky 1998 1998 
6 Czech Republic Fischer 2009 2010 
7 Czech Republic Rusnok 2013 2014 
8 Finland Tuomioja 1953 1954 
9 Finland von Fieandt 1957 1958 
10 Finland Kuuskoski 1958 1958 
11 Finland Lehto 1963 1964 
12 Finland Aura I 1970 1970 
13 Finland Aura II 1971 1972 
14 Finland Liinamaa 1975 1975 
15 Greece Grivas 1989 1989 
16 Greece Zolotas I 1989 1990 
17 Greece Zolotas II 1990 1990 
18 Greece Papademos 2011 2012 
19 Greece Pikrammenos 2012 2012 
20 Hungary Bajnai 2009 2010 
21 Italy Ciampi 1993 1994 
22 Italy Dini 1995 1996 
23 Italy Monti 2011 2013 
24 Latvia Skele 1995 1997 
25 Poland Belka 2004 2005 
26 Portugal Nobre de Costa 1978 1978 
27 Portugal Monta Pinto 1978 1979 
28 Portugal Pintassilgo 1979 1979 
29 Romania Văcăroiu I 1992 1994 
30 Romania Văcăroiu II 1994 1996 
31 Romania Văcăroiu II 1996 1996 
                                                 
4 The discrepancy between her stated 32 observations and the mentioned number of 31 in this paper is 
grounded in a flaw in her table of observations of technocratic governments (double count of one entry) 
(Pastorella, 2014c, pp. 2-4) 
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Source: Pastorella (2014c), corrections by author 
Already a quick view on this list of technocratic governments shows that the vast 
majority of them held offices for a very short time period, often not exceeding a couple 
of months. This raises the questions if all 31 observations can indeed be seen as true 
technocratic governments that decide on major policy issues, as a large share of them 
can be seen as being caretaker governments that hold office only to deal with the 
everyday tasks of governments until the next elections, and preparing these elections is 
often a main task of these short-termed caretaker governments (McDonnell, 2013; 
McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014; Pastorella, 2014a; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopouou, 
2013). When excluding this special type of government, it shows that only four cabinets 
qualify for the term non-caretaker technocratic government since the outbreak of the 
European financial and debt crisis as shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Non-caretaker technocratic governments since 2007. 
 Country Prime Minister Period 
1 Hungary Bajnai 2009 – 2010 
2 Czech Republic Fischer 2009 – 2010 
3 Greece Papademos 2011 – 2012 
4 Monti Monti 2011 - 2013 
Source: McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014) 
 
Although the discussion around the reasons for the occurrence of technocratic 
governments will be the focus of a later chapter in this paper (Chapter 2.2.3), it is 
already worth pointing out the common policies adopted or implemented by these 
governments: fiscal adjustments via austerity measures (McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014, 
p. 663). As this thesis focuses on the role of technocratic governments during the 
European debt crisis, these cabinets are of particular interest.  
 
2.2.2 Technocratic governments and democracy  
 
Are technocratic governments endangering the concept of democracy in Europe 
(Dargent, 2014; Financial Times, 2011; Hopkin, 2012b; Radaelli, 1999; The Economist, 
2011; The Telegraph, 2014), or can they be just understood as democracy by other 
means (Pastorella, 2014b) and are therefore not threatening democracies at all 
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(Schuldson, 2006; Williams, 2006)? As it is not the main objective of this thesis to 
come to a final conclusion on the relationship between technocracy and democracy, but 
to contribute to the discussion around their origins and explanations for their 
appointment, only some counterarguments that challenge the widely held and 
sometimes intuitive accusation towards technocratic governments of being 
undemocratic will be presented briefly in order to prevent the impression of taking a 
negative normative stance on these cabinets. Referring to Runciman (2012), Motha 
(2012) argues that allowing for technocratic governments can be actually seen as a 
strength of democracies as they can suspend themselves in times of exceptional 
circumstances5, thus preventing a shift towards autocracy by using technocracy as a 
valve. The distinguishing feature here is that technocracies allow the previous system of 
rule to return, which is not the case for autocracies. Pastorella (2014b) identifies five 
strands of common criticisms towards technocratic governments, which are categorised 
as (1) the  rule of law, (2) the break of the chain of delegation and less electoral 
accountability, (3) undermining political parties and party government, (4) lack of 
political competition and people’s participation and (5) a neoliberal problem. She 
further presents arguments that challenge the criticism within each of these categories6: 
First, regarding the rule of law and the accusation that technocratic governments don’t 
go in line with constitutional principles, it can be seen that in those countries that 
experienced technocratic cabinets constitutions often not only allow them, but 
sometimes explicitly call for such solutions in certain circumstances (for instance 
Greece where the constitution requires the appointment of the president of the supreme 
court to form a government in case that all attempts for government formation fail). 
Second, referring to the break of the chain of delegation and a reduction of democratic 
accountability (Neto & Strøm, 2006), it can be argued that parties in parliaments still 
have control over the government, independent of its partisan or non-partisan 
composition. Further, as again evidence from countries that had technocratic 
governments show, such cabinets often not only enjoy large support from 
parliamentarians, but that support is also often cross-partisan, as technocratic 
                                                 
5 See Schmitt (1923) 
6 Pastorella’s paper focuses on claims towards actual technocratic governments that occurred during the 
last decade and the mechanisms of their policy making, an approach sufficient for the purpose of this 
chapter. For a more theoretical discussion about a technocratic mind-set see for instance Ribbhagen 
(2011). 
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governments are often governments of national unity. Third, drawing on the criticism 
that technocratic governments undermine parties and party governments, a technocratic 
government can be understood as representing the actual will of the electorate as it is 
common that in scenarios where a technocratic cabinet is appointed, public trust and 
support for traditional parties is very low, and a technocratic government can be 
therefore seen not as the cause, but as a symptom of a weakened party democracy 
(Pastorella (2014b) referring to Hanley (2013)). Fourth, regarding the lack of political 
competition and the claim that there is no place for criticism of policies and 
propositions during technocratic governments, it can be argued that evidence shows that 
technocratic ministers had to justify their policies even more than partisan ministers, 
and their deliberation of policies can be even more honest as they don’t have to worry 
about an upcoming election. Fifth, drawing on the claim that technocratic governments 
have a imported neoliberal bias, it can be stated that, as the ideology of the appointed 
people is usually well known, they do not import a neoliberal agenda from outside after 
their appointment, but are selected and appointed because of their already existing 
ideological stance. Staying away from decision making that is based on ideology and 
focusing on efficiency and pace can therefore be seen as a certain ideology itself. A 
further common claim towards technocratic governments is that they are more 
responsive to external pressures, a view particularly held in connection to the ongoing 
European debt crisis and measures of austerity (Pasquino & Valbruzzi, 2012). However, 
it is not really clear why such cabinets should be more responsive to external pressures 
as the concept of a technocratic government itself makes them react less outside calls. 
As a conclusion it shall be pointed out that the widespread accusation of technocratic 
governments being generally undemocratic can be, at least, challenged and should not 
be taken for granted. Taking these arguments into account, as well as the fact that all 
democracies in the European Union that appointed technocratic cabinets temporarily 
returned to classic partisan government compositions after some time, a neutral stance 
on technocratic governments, a view represented in this paper, can be justified.  
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2.2.3 Explaining the occurrence of technocratic governments 
 
As already identified, technocratic governments are rare events in European 
democracies, and their heaped occurrence since the outbreak of the European financial 
and debt crisis is puzzling, thus raising the question about underlying factors that make 
partisan governments shift towards technocratic ones. But what these factors are is only 
vaguely known at this point, and whereas research that looks at selected technocratic 
governments is widely published (Adinolfi (2013); Bickerton and Accetti (2013); 
Ciaglia and Mazzoni (2014); Culpepper (2014); Featherstone, Kazamias, and 
Papadimitriou (2001); Maragoni (2012); Marangoni and Verzichelli (2014); Tucker et 
al. (2000); Verzichelli (2012)), this is surprisingly not the case for systematic studies 
that try to identify what parameters increase the likelihood of technocratic governments 
across countries, and to the author’s knowledge, Kaplan (2014) and Pastorella (2014c) 
are the only scholarly publications where the authors developed a likelihood model for 
technocratic governments. Both proposed models put emphasis on the impact of 
economic crises (the later in this paper proposed advancement to the model draws on 
this emphasis), but Kaplan’s sole focus on Latin American countries makes it hardly 
usable for the analysis of technocratic governments in Europe. For this purpose 
Pastorella’s model is of great use. Starting from two scenarios where a shift to a 
technocratic cabinet can happen, namely cabinet dissolutions that are not followed by 
elections immediately and deadlocks in the process of government formation, she 
identifies six variables, two institutional and four contingent ones, which have an 
impact on the likelihood of a technocratic government as seen in table 5. 
Table 5: Technocracy likelihood model, variables and their impact. 
Institutional Impact Contingent Impact 
Monarch  -3.216 Scandal 1.630 
Constructive vote of no confidence -0.754 Economic crisis 0.729 
  Party system fragmentation 0.243 
  Head of state powers 0.069 
Source: Pastorella (2014c) 
 
The calculated impact of these variables largely confirms some general thinking about 
the conditions that motivate countries to appoint a technocratic governments as seen in 
table 6 and 7. 
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Table 6: Likelihood model, institutional variables and their logic 
Variable Logic 
Monarch Monarchs are expected to be the least powerful heads 
of state and monarchs will not exert more than their 
formal powers of cabinet appointment (avoiding the 
impression of an attempt to bring back absolute 
monarchical rule) 
 
Constructive vote of no confidence Parliament must find a majority to agree on a new 
prime minister at the same time when voting on a 
confidence withdrawal for the government in office, 
thus making it harder to use it as a strategic 
instrument 
Source: Pastorella (2014c) 
 
Table 7: Likelihood model, contingent variables and their logic 
Variable Logic 
Scandal Public opinion shocks opens the political space for 
new actors, electorate is more prone to accept a 
technocratic government when political elites are 
involved in a scandal 
 
Economic crisis Technocrats in leading government positions reassure 
both markets and voters that necessary reforms will 
be carried out rapidly, and parties might be able to 
avoid being blamed for the costs connected to these 
reforms  
 
Party system fragmentation Legislative fragmentation correlates with younger 
political parties whose electorate’s support is not 
purely based on long-established ideological 
identification and might accept a technocratic 
solution more than established parties 
 
Head of state powers Evidence that number of non-partisan ministers is 
higher in presidential and semi-presidential systems 
and the appointment of cabinets can be used to 
maximise the ability of the head of state to follow 
own policy goals 
Source: Pastorella (2014c) 
Given the presence of the largest economic crisis in the history of the Eurozone and the 
observation of a comparably high number of technocratic governments during that 
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period, the economic crisis variable deserves some special attention, especially as the 
term economic crisis includes a vast diversity of crises, for instance banking, credit and 
debt crises. Pastorella’s model is therefore limited to some extend as it does not allow 
for variation in regard to the presence of an economic crisis. As outlined in the previous 
chapter on the European debt crisis, countries belonging to different varieties of 
capitalism are expected to be not only hit in different ways by the crisis, but also to 
react differently in the sense that their different institutional setup modifies the impact 
on governments. How this economic crisis variable can be advanced by including a 
Varieties of Capitalism perspective will be described in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Research Questions, Hypotheses and Research Design 
 
3.1 Research puzzle, questions and hypotheses 
 
Drawing on the reviewed literature, the question why only some governments appoint 
technocratic governments when facing severe pressure for fiscal consolidation remains 
unanswered. As shown in the previous chapter, allowing for only one dichotomous 
variable in the technocracy likelihood model that refers to the current European debt 
crisis is problematic as it hides the variety of ways in which countries have to deal with 
their debt levels, bailouts and fiscal adjustments. The main research question can be 
thus stated as: 
 
RQ1: Why were technocratic governments appointed only in a small number of 
countries, although the majority of countries faced the same economic crisis and similar 
pressures for austerity measures? 
 
Referring to the previously described technocracy likelihood model and keeping its 
limitations in connection to the economic crisis in mind, the main hypothesis proposes 
an answer to this question. By bringing in an institutional perspective that follows the 
outlined varieties of capitalism approach and making use of the model of three varieties 
of capitalism as introduced by Molina and Rhodes (2007), thus bridging both theoretical 
perspectives, I propose the inclusion of a new variable, namely the VOC category of a 
country. This follows the idea that backlashes, both among the public as well as within 
politics, are more likely in MMEs for two main reasons: Their institutional setup is the 
furthest away from the liberal reforms there are pressured to adopt (making adjustments 
more costly and generating positive effects only in the medium to long run) and they are 
lacking coordination mechanisms that could mediate adjustment processes.  
 
H1: The appointment of a technocratic government is more likely in MME countries 
than in countries with other VOC setups. 
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This proposal is based on the finding that MMEs realise only considerably smaller 
deficit reductions when running a periods of fiscal consolidation (table 8).  Further, as 
MMEs tend to consolidate their budgets by increasing their revenue (either by one time 
effects generated by the selling of public assets or increased taxes), but not by cutting 
their expenditures (figure 2), backlashes are expected to be larger when facing need for 
adopting measures of austerity, may they be externally imposed or not. We can 
therefore identify a cluster of MME countries that usually consolidates their finances 
differently from CME and LME countries. The backlashes thus increase the incentives 
for countries to appoint technocratic governments during such economic crises. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between primary balance adjustment composition and long term effect of 
PBA on debt during 12 largest fiscal adjustment periods in the EU 
Source: Gros and Alcidi (2010), classification of VOC by author, MME countries include Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and France 
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Table 8: VOC classification of large debt decreases. 
 
VOC 
 Average Duration (years) Average 
Decrease (% 
GDP) 
Average Decrease per Year 
(% GDP) 
     
CME  11,25 30,17 2,77 
LME  11,90 47,45 3,98 
MME  11,20 23,00 2,16 
Total / Average  11,45 33,54 2,97 
Source: Abbas, Belhocine, El-Ganainy, and Horton (2011), calculations based on IMF HPPD 
 
Bridging the two theoretical perspectives will be useful in several ways, and the 
following stated hypotheses are meant to make the connection between a countries 
VOC setup and the form of crisis government (technocratic or partisan) visible. First, 
compared with LME and CME countries, the positive effects of fiscal adjustments are 
expected to be smaller and happen only during a longer time horizon in MME countries. 
For governments this has the effect of reducing the need for avoiding being blamed for 
the implementation of adjustment measures (the incentive might even be contraire and 
governments try to collect the electoral rewards for bringing the economy back on 
track7). 
 
H1.1: MME countries realise the benefits of adjustments later than other VOCs, thus 
raising the incentives for governments to avoid blame. 
 
Second, taking into account the evidence from previous large fiscal adjustments, MME 
countries have no history of consolidating their budgets via cutting expenditures. 
Therefore austerity measures, as demanded by the troika or financial markets, go against 
the VOC features (in terms of established institutions) of MME countries. 
 
                                                 
7 This refers to the idea of the economic vote of the electorate, see for instance Boix and Stokes (2007) 
and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) 
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H1.2: Cutting expenditures is harder in MME countries as interest groups have more 
power to make use of veto points. 
 
Third, looking at the unequally distributed share of employees being represented by 
powerful unions and socially protected, which can be viewed as a conflict between 
insiders versus outsiders, or the private versus public sector, makes cross-class conflicts 
more likely. This conflicts further lack the mediation of social pacts, thus making it 
harder for partisan governments to adopt adjustment measures as they are more 
vulnerable to veto points. 
 
H1.3: The heterogenic spread of employees’ protection and union representation in 
connection to the absence of social pacts make it harder for partisan governments in 
MME countries to adopt fiscal adjustments. 
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3.2 Dependent and independent variables 
 
In order to analyse the connection between the presence of an economic crises, the 
institutional characteristics of a country, and their effect on the form of crisis 
government (technocratic or partisan), the mapping of the elements under investigation, 
which form the used variables, is straight forward. The need for fiscal reform forms the 
independent variable (IV) and can be operationalised as the concurrence of dangerously 
high debt levels or high interest rates for government bonds in connection to the 
presence of an economic crisis.  As the shift towards a technocratic crisis government 
constitutes the main focus of this research it forms the dependent variable (DV). For the 
purpose of this research it is enough to just state that this variable has a ‘true’ value if it 
fits the definition of a technocratic government as described in chapter 2.2. As the IV 
has the same true value for the vast majority of countries in the Eurozone during the 
current crisis, namely the presence of such a need for fiscal reform, an intervening 
variable (intV) that explains the different outcomes has to be included. This intV is 
formulated by a countries dominant variety of capitalism and can be either LME, CME 
or MME.  
In connection to the technocracy likelihood framework, it is justified for the purpose of 
this research, namely finding an answer why technocratic governments have only been 
appointed in some of the Eurozone countries as well as pointing out the advantages of 
advancing that model with a VOC variable, to focus that intV during the following case 
study. In that case the other variables that are included in the model (monarchy, 
constructive vote of no confidence, scandal, party system fragmentation, and head of 
state powers) have to be held constant, which has to be taken into account when 
selecting cases. 
 
            IV                                        intV                                         DV 
Need for fiscal reform                 VOC setup                  Form of crisis government 
Figure 3: Map of variables under investigation 
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3.3 Method, case selection and data 
 
As it is visible in chapter 4 where the stated hypotheses are assessed empirically, a 
quantitative analysis that makes use of statistic techniques is not enough to understand 
the reality in countries under crisis as well as the influence of VOC setups on the reform 
process and government compositions. This is especially problematic as only a small 
number of countries qualify for an analysis of VOC impacts on fiscal reform processes. 
For this purpose, a comparative qualitative analysis of the reform process in Greece, 
Ireland and Italy will be carried out. At first, the VOC characteristics of each country 
are described in detail. Starting from there, the countries’ economic problems (in 
connection to their VOC characteristics) that lead to dangerously high levels of debt to 
GDP ratios and interest rates for governmental bonds will be laid out. Subsequently, the 
reform processes that took place in these countries will be analysed, with a special focus 
on interest group pressure on the formulation of reform measures and their political 
implementation. This analysis will follow the structure of the previously stated 
hypotheses.  
A small n research design is chosen for this comparison. This decision is based 
on the desire to figure out what causes governmental shifts towards technocratic 
governance and to uncover the various factors that influence these procedures. Beside 
that consideration, the focus on countries that suffer from the European deb crisis and 
thus had to seek for help from the international financial institutions as a result of very 
high debt to GDP ratios and bond interest rates, which made re-financing on the bond 
markets too costly or even impossible, and being limited to fiscal policy reforms as they 
are part of the common European currency, thus not having monetary policy in their 
own national hands anymore, already limits the available number of countries to quite a 
few. Within the concept of a small n research, I will choose a most similar system 
design (MSSD) to conduct my study. This makes sense: First, the focus on a specific 
geographical area already favours a MSSD design (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 
2011). Second, the countries in focus all share a common set of indicators (like being 
open economies, Eurozone members, electoral democracies, similar levels of 
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development (UNDP, 2013)). Third, the outcome of the countries is obviously different, 
as only a minority of countries face shifts towards technocracy. Therefore it is necessary 
to look for an explanation for that difference in outcome (reform measures carried out 
by technocratic governments or by a partisan government). Choosing Greece and Italy 
as countries representing the MME value for the proposed additional VOC variable 
comes naturally as all other countries in that VOC group do not qualify for the 
previously described need for holding the other variables of the technocracy likelihood 
model constant: Spain is a monarchy and Portugal as well as France are semi-
presidential republics. Picking Ireland as the counterpart that faced similar reform 
pressures, but experienced a different crisis government composition and belongs to the 
LME category comes natural as well, as no other LME country is a member of the 
Eurozone. 
Regarding original data, the analysis will make mainly use of reports from the 
European Commission, Eurostat, as well as press releases of Irish unions and 
employers’ federations. When attempting to analyse the press release of Greek and 
Italian unions as well as other interest groups in those countries, the research faces the 
problem that documents and statements released by these Greek and Italian institutions 
are often not available in English. In that case this research makes use of secondary 
sources. 
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Chapter 4: Comparative Case Study 
 
4.1 Introducing the cases, their VOC setups, and crisis impact 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, countries like Greece or Italy do not fit into the 
original VOC model, but the proposed model of three varieties of capitalism satisfies 
their needs, and they can be put into the MME category of countries. The institutional 
setup of Greece goes well in line with the configuration of MME countries 
(Featherstone, 2008), as bargaining is centralised and well regulated by the state. 
Further, its production system (the sum of firms) is fragmented, as are social protection 
mechanisms (welfare, labour market, and employment regulations): The majority of 
employees in the public sector enjoys high levels of security, whereas employees of the 
private sector, especially those in small and medium enterprises, lack such security. 
Italy largely reflects the same structure as bargaining is centralised but also struggles to 
deliver collective goods (Molina & Rhodes, 2007), and the country also shows a severe 
gap in terms of social protection of public sector and private sector employees. This 
difference can also be seen between older employees that joined firms a decade ago, and 
young people who are mainly employed on the basis of short term fixed contracts 
(Bloomberg, 2011; Tealdi, 2011). Further, just as in Greece, a long history of industrial 
relations conflicts make it difficult to reach consensus across classes or between insiders 
(those within protected sectors) and outsiders, and in both countries the state uses its 
powers to intervene in the economy in order to compensate for the shortcomings of 
flawed bargaining processes and the lack of collective good provision (Molina & 
Rhodes, 2007).  
Regarding union representation it can be stated that unions are politically strong and can 
make effective use of veto points in order to block reforms, but are highly fragmented 
and do not engage in a collective social partnership arrangement. Featherstone (2008), 
referring to the institutional setup of Greece, notes that  
“the structure of conflict is strongly marked by the mode of representation 
within the major bodies. Both the union (GSEE and ADEDY) and employers’ 
(SEV) federations have internal representation that is skewed towards certain 
groups, over-playing their interests. In the union confederations, 
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disproportionate strength has been enjoyed by employees of the public sector, 
affecting the stance of the leadership on key economic and social issues. At the 
same time, the employers’ federation has displayed the predominance of the few 
very large firms (some ex-state monopolies). This has favoured the distinctive 
interests of those who have benefited from the prevailing market regulations, 
barriers to entry, and stable product demand.” 
(Featherstone, 2008, p. 7) 
Similar features are found within the Italian case regarding union representation. The 
three main trade unions are the CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour), CISL 
(Italian Confederation of Workers Trade Unions) and UIL (Italian Labour Union), 
representing a total of 12.5 million members, and they have to work with the fact that 
most companies they deal with are small enterprises, whereas large private firms only 
account for a few numbers. The average union density is around 30%. Namuth (2012) 
further describes that 
“[..] strategies of the three federations are diverging strongly. Only CGIL 
possesses the required strength for mass mobilisations, and is usually able to 
count on additional support on demonstrations from the ranks of the moderate 
left Partito Democratico and the smaller left-wing parties. This strength has 
been applied successfully in recent years to protest against Berlusconi and to 
apply pressure against the cuts put forward by the Monti government.” 
(Namuth, 2012, p. 5) 
In addition to this already rather inefficient bargaining and union system, the Greek 
government suffers from a very high share of black economy, thus a large share of taxes 
never make it to the government. In their analysis of the Greek shadow economy 
Berger, Pickhardt, Pitsoulis, Prinz, and Sardà (2013, p. 11) estimate that the black 
economy’s size reached around 60% of GDP in 2008 (as compared to around 5% in 
Germany or 10% in Spain). They also show that such a high prevalence of a shadow 
economy crates negative effects on a countrie’s fiscal policy (Berger et al., 2013, p. 13). 
Summing up, the absence of a collective bargaining system, the presence of fragmented 
union representation and a dual security system, as well as features of clientelism, make 
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Greece a prime example of a MME country. As stated earlier, MMEs tend to 
underperform, therefore one can already assume that the Greek economy was growing 
slower than LMEs or CMEs in the last decade by simple logic reasoning. After joining 
the Eurozone8 Greece lost control over its monetary policy which is considered to be a 
crucial tool for export-led and tourism dependent Mediterranean countries. This 
characterised a drastic turn as it was no longer possible for these countries to devalue 
their currency in order to lower the price of their exports or make tourism more 
affordable to foreigners. Combined with the problems that derive from the MME setup 
of the Greek economy it is now clear that the heavy capital inflow since the adoption of 
the euro intensified the dilemma created by imbalances in terms of competitiveness of 
national economies, thus leading to very high debt levels9. The Italian story of the 
European debt crisis reads similar to the Greek one as it is also grounded in a loss of 
competitiveness and a relaxation of austere policies after the country successfully 
entered the Eurozone, a process reinforced after the election victory of Silvio Berlusconi 
in 2001 who promised to cut taxes, but left public spending untouched (Hopkin, 2012a) 
and in 2011 the countries debt to GDP level reached 120%. Hopkin further states that 
although Italy was in a more stable position than other countries in Southern Europe, 
debt levels as well as interest rates on government bonds (the price a country has to pay 
to finance their debt) reached unsustainable heights, leaving the country in a de-facto 
state of bankruptcy (Orsi, 2013). 
 
While both Greece and Italy can be described as countries where corporatist structures 
are dense, Ireland is very much the opposite (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). Within the 
original VOC model, Ireland is usually characterised as a liberal market economy and it 
definitely shares many of the characteristics connected to LMEs such as the domination 
of market mechanisms for economic coordination. Its production structure also fits the 
LME category well, as the banking and IT sector, which are seeking for risky 
                                                 
8 The entire debate around the Greek accession to the Eurozone shall not be part of this study here, 
although it is worth to note that this process did not happen smoothly and Greece tricked is way into the 
Eurozone. For a detailed analysis see Bitzenis and Makedos (2013) 
9 For a general description why the features of MME countries (Southern European countries) contributed 
to unsustainably high debt levels see chapter 2.1.3 in this thesis 
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innovations and relying on a fluid “hire-and-fire” mentality and a largely unregulated 
product market, are dominating the Irish economy. 
Despite the expectation, the rate of employees which are members union members is 
surprisingly high at a rate of 32.3% (OECD, 2013). Nevertheless, in CME countries 
trade unions can maintain their strength in negotiations despite lower rates of 
membership due to their mobilization capacities when calling for strikes (Thelen & van 
Wijnbergen, 2003). Further, when looking on the composition of the Irish economy it 
becomes clear that a large share of the country’s biggest companies are American, 
which is a result of Ireland’s attempt to attract large foreign investments since the 
1990s. Within these American companies, over 80% do not recognise unions (Roche, 
2001). Further there is no mandatory membership in employers’ umbrella organisations 
and wage bargaining is not very centralized, but in fact, the social dialogue, the 
negotiations between employers and unions, is tripartite and consist of the government, 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and the Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation (IBEC). Uncommon for a liberal market economy, this represents a 
social partnership structure. Nevertheless, an important characteristic here is that the 
government takes part in these negotiations, thus making it more likely that negotiation 
outcomes are similar to the demands made by the governments (and therefore in line 
with reform measures). It is therefore likely that higher competitiveness through lower 
wages is considerably easier to achieve in Ireland compared to other countries in the 
Eurozone  as interest group pressure is lower and moderated by the government 
(McGuinness, Kelly, & O'Connell, 2008).  Social protection is an issue where Ireland 
resembles a typical LME again as employment protection is low and the labour market 
is characterised by high flexibility. By combining characteristics of LMEs with certain 
centralized coordination elements that are typical for CMEs (Antoniades, 2007), Ireland 
constitutes a case that is difficult to put into a VOC category. Nevertheless, for the sake 
of this analysis it is legit to put Ireland into the category of LME countries as the overall 
structure of the economy is characterized by a liberal and deregulated Anglo-Saxon 
model and elements of CME countries are implemented in a way that make collective 
interest representation, and therefore their success when trying to push for certain 
policies, less effective. Taking this combination into account one can assume that 
reform measures, as set by the government, are not only supported by a larger share of 
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actors as they feel heard during the reform process, but are also easier to implement as 
interest groups don’t have an easy way to block them. This way Ireland remains a 
liberal market economy country, but the legitimacy of reform measures benefits from 
that social partnership (Daly, 2005). 
A look at Ireland’s debt to GDP ratio over time shows that the country’s deficits where 
considerably low which goes in line with the general finding of chapter 4.1 that LME 
countries on average accumulate lower levels of debt, and when doing so, only run 
deficits for a shorter period of time. In fact, Ireland managed to achieve a very high 
reduction of its debt to GDP level since the 1990s (from over 100% in the early 1990s 
to 25% of GDP in 2008 before it got hit by the crisis). This reduction of debt was 
mainly driven by an expansion of the economic output which followed a strategy that 
was focused on export and foreign direct investment (FDI). Growth rates were actually 
so high that the country was widely labelled the “celtic tiger” (Chari & Bernhagen, 
2011; Crafts, 2008). Nevertheless, this boom ended in the 2000s and Ireland now was 
labelled a dead Celtic Tiger and scholarly attention focused on its end (Donovan & 
Murphy, 2013). But besides the end of the economic boom, Ireland got hit hard by the 
European economic crisis, in particular its banking sector with its large amounts of 
risky assets, mainly in the housing and property sector, which was an investment in a 
property bubble that burst by the end of the 2000s. Compared to most other European 
countries that suffered severely from the crisis, it was not a decade long accumulation of 
high debt levels that brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy, but the debt to GDP 
ratio rose sharply in a short time when the government decided to save the banks that 
were in trouble the deepest10. Nevertheless, these bailouts don’t tell the full story, and 
an investigation of the Irish banking regulatory regime shows that it features a 
characteristic that is usually associated with MME or Mediterranean countries: 
clientelism. Chari and Bernhagen (2011) see a close connection between the state, 
banks, and the real estate industry and mention a common change of staff positions 
between these three sectors, thus leading to a negative effect on the independence of the 
Irish Central Bank and the country’s regulatory institutions. They also uncover lobbying 
activities targeted at the national government. By having a look at the Irish economic 
development the difficulties that emerged when classifying Ireland as a specific variety 
                                                 
10 If such bailouts are necessary or useful is part of a wider debate, see for instance Miller (2011) and 
Cordella and Yeyati (2003), that cannot be discussed within this paper 
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of capitalism just continue when framing the country’s positions at the height of the 
European economic crisis as it combines a regime that is primary based on fluid market 
mechanisms, which in times of reform benefit from a social partnership that includes 
the government itself, with clientelistic features that one would not necessarily expect to 
see in a LME country. Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate these developments. 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of public debt to GDP ratios, 1995 – 2012. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Development of central government surplus/deficit as % of GDP, 1995 – 2012. 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Figure 6: Development of 10 year bond yields, 1993 – 2011. 
Source: Andolfatto (2012), Data from European Central Bank Statistical Warehouse 
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4.2 Adjustment programs, fiscal reform measures, and outcomes 
 
By the end of 2009 Greece accumulated debt of around 130% of GDP. Added to this 
was the fact that international borrowers lost their trust in the Greek government, thus 
leading to interests rates higher than Greece could afford in order to refinance their debt. 
Therefore Greece had no other choice than to apply for a fiscal assistance programme, 
which it entered in spring 2010 and was therefore the first Eurozone country in a 
financial assistance programme carried out by the Troika (ECB, IMF and European 
Commission). So far this programme has disappointed and can be considered to be the 
least successful of the Troika’s financial assistance programmes (Sapir, Wolff, de 
Sousa, & Terzi, 2014). This programme asked for strong measures by the Greek 
government in order to achieve fiscal consolidation and increase its competitiveness. 
These measures, also often labelled austerity measures, clearly demanded a shift of 
institutions towards a more liberal model (such as a smaller role of the state, reduced 
public spending, lower wages, lower social security payments or unemployment 
benefits). Although these measures, together with the stabilization of the euro by the 
EU’s demonstrated willingness to not let countries in severe troubles go loose, were 
expected to bring Greece back on track, an empirical analysis shows no such positive 
effects. As Sapir et al. (2014) show the very assumptions at the initial stage of the 
financial assistance programme proofed to be largely wrong:  
“The first and most striking finding is that reality proved the initial programme 
assumptions largely wrong. When financial assistance was granted in 2010, it 
was expected that growth would resume in 2012, unemployment would peak at 
14.8% in 2012, no debt restructuring was needed, the debt ratio would peak in 
2013 at 149 percent of GDP and that the government would recover market 
access in 2013. None of these assumptions proved nearly close to correct. Real 
domestic demand collapsed by around 30%, the unemployment rate rose to over 
25%, while real GDP fell by more than 20%. The European Commission had 
estimated the size of the competitiveness problem, and the subsequent price 
adjustment need, to amount to around 20-30%. The baseline assumption of the 
programme was that price developments, as well as unit labour costs, would be 
less than the euro area average by 2011, thereby leading to a relative price  
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adjustment. However, price rigidities in the economy proved to be very severe 
and relative price levels did not start to correct until 2013.” 
(Sapir et al., 2014, p. 23ff.) 
Although pressures on the Italian fiscal health were similar to Greece, the country did 
not ask for assistance from the IMF, and its reform efforts thus did not follow the same 
formal approach and assessments. Reform efforts took place mainly between 2011 and 
2013 (European Commission, 2014a), and were thus mainly carried out by the Monti 
government, with majority of reforms happening in the area of liberalising the business 
environment. The largest achievements were realised in the area of professional 
services, where the government was able to implement the abolition of compulsory 
minimum tariffs, more relaxed terms for traineeships and the right to establish 
companies among professionals, and administrative simplifications (ibid.). But already 
the cabinet preceding Monti, Berlusconi’s, managed to realise budget surpluses, but as 
Hopkin (2012a) argues this was mainly the case because of Italy’s low levels of 
unemployment support, thus enabling the automatic stabilisers to function. 
Nevertheless, as the country took a quite austere rout from the very beginning, the trust 
of the markets in the country did not drop as much as in Portugal or Spain when the 
“crisis of confidence” (ibid. p. 44) spread. Nevertheless, in the end also Italy faced the 
previously mentioned unsustainable situation, as markets became increasingly cautious 
about contagion, and they identified Italy as the next weak country in the Eurozone. 
Referring to Pagano (2010), Hopkin notes that  
“to that extend, Italy’s slide into debt crisis was in part the result of a self-
fulfilling prophecy triggered by broader fears about the future of the euro.” 
(Hopkin, 2012a, p. 44) 
By looking the current level of Italy’s debt to GDP ratio, which accounts for 131.8%, it 
becomes clear that the policies the country followed did not reduce the overall fiscal 
dangers the country faces (Eurostat, 2015). 
Generally speaking, the Irish financial assistance programme as directed by the 
troika is considered to be a success, and three years after it started in November 2011 
the Eurogroup confirmed the success of the programme and announced Irelands exist 
for the end of 2013. By today, Ireland is now under the Troika’s post-programme 
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surveillance (Sapir et al., 2014). Briefly speaking, the financial assistance programme 
summed up to an amount of 85 billion euros (35 billion euros for the financial system, 
the rest for government funding) and included loans from the EU and IMF, but also 
bilateral assistance in the form of loans from countries like Sweden, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom (German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2015). Abide the reformation of 
the Irish financial sector, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Irish 
government and the Troika required large-scare fiscal austerity measures to be put into 
place in exchange for access to these loans. These conditions include a 15 billion euros 
governmental budget adjustment, split into 10 billion euros of expenditure savings and 5 
billion euros in taxes, calling for measures such as lowering the personal income tax 
bands, a reduction of pension tax relief, and a general reduction of tax expenditures.  
The call for structural labour market reforms called for a reduction of the 
minimum wage, a reform of the unemployment insurance system and enhancing the 
conditionality on work and training availability (O'Carroll, 2010). Abide the success of 
the fiscal reforms that came with the assistance programme, it also addressed the Irish 
financial sector and pressed for reforms. 
But is the mere fact that Ireland was able to exit that programme (so far it has 
been the only country able to do so) enough to label the Irish reform programme 
successful? During the times of the assistance programme the Irish economic indicators 
improved (Sapir et al., 2014, p. 33), although not as fast as initially hoped (European 
Commission, 2011). From mid-2011 the assistance programme, after being redesigned 
to account for the experiences of the first six months, and the economic indicators 
developed as expected by the Troika during the rest of the programme time. Assessing 
the assistance programme’s success Sapir et al. (2014) state that  
“This was due not only to the rigorous implementation by the Irish 
government of the fiscal plans but also to the relatively realistic programme 
assumptions on economic growth. When read through the lenses of our 
criterion 3 for programme success (expectations vs. outcomes), the Irish 
programme can thus be seen as broadly successful.” 
(Sapir et al., 2014, p. 33) 
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In fact, the Irish primary balancing adjustment was so effective that the country is 
second in the adjustment progress index of all Eurozone countries (Schmieding & 
Schulz, 2013). 
Looking at Ireland’s past makes it clear that the country has already a decade of 
experience with reforms that liberalize the economy, namely since the policy shift 
towards export orientation and the focus on attracting foreign direct investment. This 
growth strategy relies heavily on low corporation taxes (12.5%), much lower than the 
average in CME countries. This is perfectly in line with the VOC model that locates a 
smaller welfare state in LME countries which logically needs less financial resources. 
The institutional support for such Irish policies was pushed by the Industrial 
Development Agency, but was institutionalized only shortly before the boom phase 
during the late 1990s (O'Sullivan, 2000). 
Winding up the Irish case on its fiscal adjustment programme, one finds that the 
country already had a history of liberalization reforms when it started to reform its 
economy towards an export-driven economy, while at the same time creating a social 
partnership model that includes various economic actors in the negotiations over 
economic policy. In contrast to CME countries where such partnerships exclude the 
actual government and have therefore a considerably large veto power, the Irish version 
of that social partnership brings the government on the table together with the interest 
groups. This leads to a greater support within the society (where businesses are an 
integral part) and general attitude of doing what needs to be done. This attitude, together 
with the fact that the austerity demands that came with the financial assistance 
programme were in line with previously experienced liberalization efforts and the 
overall liberal structure of the Irish economy, made it possible for Ireland fare very well 
(Schmieding & Schulz, 2013). 
Concluding on the outcomes of fiscal adjustments in the three studied cases, Ireland and 
Italy were able to slow down their upwards trend as shown in figure 7 on the next page. 
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Figure 7: Government debt to GDP ratio, 3rd quarter 2014  
Source: Eurostat (2015) 
 
By evaluation the different adjustment processes and outcomes as described in this 
chapter, it can be stated that the hypothesis H1.1, which states that MME countries 
realise the benefits of adjustments later than other VOCs, thus raising the incentives for 
governments to avoid blame, holds.   
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4.3 Interest group reactions and backlashes 
 
As the three varieties of capitalism model (Molina & Rhodes, 2007) identifies a 
variation of union structures and powers between different VOC categories, if follows 
that differences in the actual reaction of unions and their usage of veto powers can be 
expected. The two biggest trade unions in Greece are the GSEE and ADEDY, 
representing employees, whereas the SEV represents the interest of employers. Drawing 
on the features of MME countries it can be expected that all three of them oppose 
reforms towards liberalisation, as the trade unions (which mainly represent employees 
of the public sector) are afraid of reforms that endanger their favourable position of 
labour and welfare protection. Following a similar logic, the employers’ union will also 
try to block such reforms as their big members (large firms) fear the loss of state 
protection from competition and compensations. The empirical assessment of union 
statements and publications largely confirms these assumptions, and both trade unions 
and employers representation oppose the adjustment measures of the troika assistance 
programme, often in a radical way (EPSU, 2014; GSEE, 2011; The Guardian, 2012), 
and organised large public protests (Reuters, 2011). 
 The analysis of Irish union and employers’ representation reaction can be done 
in a more original way as their statements and press releases are available in English, 
and just as expected from a trade union representing the interest of employees the CTU 
largely opposes the adjustment programme which includes large wage cuts, and calls for 
an end of austerity measures. They call for the Irish government to invest in new jobs, 
skills training and a general promotion of growth (ICTU, 2010, 2011a, 2011b). In 
contrast to the ICTU’s opposition, the representation of Irish employers, the IBEC, 
appreciates the liberalisation measures in order to increase the countries 
competitiveness. In comparison to the ICTU, which also addresses the promotion of 
economic growth and the creation of jobs, the IBEC does not call for the government to 
achieve these goals, but calls for a reduction of the minimum wage and the 
abandonment of labour regulations (IBEC, 2010; Ivory, 2014). 
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The task of analysing union reactions in Italy is complicated because of the same 
problem as in the case of Greece, as official statements of important interest groups are 
not released in English. Therefore the analysis has to be based on secondary sources. 
Nevertheless, Italy shows again a very similar picture compared to Greece, and all three 
major unions (CISL, CGIL and UIL) largely oppose both austerity measures and moves 
towards liberalisations (Namuth, 2012; Reuters, 2012a, 2012b), and organised large 
strikes against these reforms. They mainly criticised the lack of governmental 
investment in growth (a claim held by all trade unions under investigation across the 
cases) and blame the Monti government for only imposing austerity measures that 
“threaten social peace” (Namuth, 2012, p. 5). This was one of the few occasions where 
the CISL and UIL joined the CGIL in organising large scale protests and strike, thus 
bringing public sector and private sectors together on the streets and imposing the threat 
of large scale strikes (ibid.). 
 On the other hand, Italy’s leading employers’ federation, the 
CONFINDUSTRIA, supported liberalizing measures throughout the crisis, especially 
those regarding regulations on labour, being in favour of reforms that make it easier to 
let off employees (Culpepper, 2014; Jones, 2012). 
 Comparing all three cases, the power of unions to mobilise their members 
against reform measures is obvious in MME countries, and by taking into account 
Ireland’s previously outlined history of liberalisations as well as its advantage of 
established social pacts it is no surprise that large scale protests and strikes, as seen in 
Greece and Italy (Hopkin, 2013), are absent in Ireland. Bringing hypotheses H1.2 and 
H1.3 into the analysis, it can be seen that the features of MME countries in terms of 
union powers and representation, mobilisation for reform blockage and unequal social 
protection indeed sums up to larger backlashes against reforms that aim to liberalise the 
production and labour markets. Both hypotheses are therefore confirmed. 
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4.4 The political game and government compositions 
 
As stated throughout this research, both Greece and Italy experienced a shift towards 
technocratic governments, which adopted a substantial part of the required adjustment 
policies, whereas such a shit did not occur in Ireland.  
In Greece, after George Papandreou’s attempt to conduct a referendum on the 
implementation of the required austerity measures failed, followed by his resignation, a 
technocratic government was apointed, led by the non-partisan Prime Minister Lucas 
Papademos, a former governor of the Bank of Greece and vice president of the 
European Central Bank, backed by a government of national unity that enjoyed cross-
partisan support in the Greek parliament. Although viewed as a technocratic 
government, it is worth to mention that his ministers where not technocrats, but had a 
partisan bias. As described in chapter 2.2, the view the government had about itself, in 
this case being a government that avoids a partisan ideology and puts efficiency before 
party conflict, justifies the description as a being a technocratic government. When 
Papademos resigned in 2012, the following elections did not provide a parliament 
configuration that allowed the formation of a cabinet, and a short term technocratic 
care-taker government, led by the head of the Supreme Administrative Court Panagiotis 
Pikrammenos, was appointed. As the only purpose of this cabinet was to prepare the 
next elections, it lasted for only one month (Pastorella, 2014a). 
Compared to Greece, Italy experienced a different kind of technocratic 
government when Mario Monti, a former European commissioner and professor of 
economics, was appointed at the peak of the European debt crisis in 2011. In contrast to 
the Greek experience, his cabinet did not include a single partisan minister. It followed a 
period of Silvio Berlusconi being Prime Minister, and the large popular support for 
Monti indicates that Italians were waiting for a major change within the political class 
(Culpepper, 2014). His appointment was triggered by the country’s need to re-gain the 
confidence of the international financial markets, and as a professor of economics, 
Monti was viewed as being perfectly capable of doing so. However, empirical evidence 
shows that his cabinet was not able to adopt as many proposals as one would expect 
given the nature of the government, and Maragoni (2012) points out that  
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“the Government has had some difficulties in overcoming (in a small amount of 
time) the resistance (if not the interlocking vetoes) of a heterogeneous 
parliamentary majority.” 
(Maragoni, 2012, p. 146) 
Unusual for a technocrat, Monti decided to adopt features of a politician and ran for the 
following elections, where he was unable to receive a significantly high share of votes, 
thus ending the two years lasting Italian experience of a fully technocratic government. 
In contrast, Ireland provides a completely different picture. A couple of months 
after the assistance agreement with the troika was signed, parliamentary elections were 
carried out, resulting in large losses for the party in charge, Fianna Fáil, as the electorate 
viewed them as being responsible for the negative effects the Irish people felt due to the 
adjustment programme. The elections thus resulted in a victory of the liberal party Fine 
Gael which formed a government with the Irish labour party. The large share of votes 
for the very pro-European party of Fine Gael indicates that the Irish people were still 
supporters of the European Union in general, although they blamed the troika for the 
costs of adjustment (Donovan & Murphy, 2013). 
 Based on the previously tested sub-hypotheses H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3, and 
reflecting on the picture this chapter provides, the overall hypothesis H1, which claims 
that the appointment of a technocratic government is more likely in MME countries 
than in countries with other VOC setups, can be stated to hold. Therefore the main 
research question of this thesis can be answered with saying that the VOC configuration 
of a country influences the incentives for countries to appoint a technocratic government 
when facing an economic crisis.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In order to answer the main research question of this thesis, namely “Why were 
technocratic governments appointed only in a small number of countries, although the 
majority of countries faced the same economic crisis and similar pressures for austerity 
measures?”, this research developed an interest group theory based on the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach connected to the economic aspects of the European debt crisis, 
which was then combined with an existing model that explains the likelihood of 
technocratic appointments. The dichotomous character of the “economic crisis”-
parameter was identified as a weakness of the model, as it hides institutional factors that 
are expected to have an impact on the incentives for parliaments to appoint technocratic 
governments. In order to advance this technocracy likelihood model, the two strands of 
literature connected to the European debt crisis, namely research on the economic 
reasons of the crisis as well as scholarly work on the occurrence of technocratic 
governments, were combined, resulting in a proposal for including the VOC 
characteristic of a country into the model. The then carried out comparative analysis of 
reform processes and governments during the European debt crisis in three countries 
broadly confirms the need for that advancement. By looking in depth at the setups and 
reform events in Greece, Ireland and Italy, it became clear that the VOC setup of a 
country influences the incentives for parliaments to appoint a technocratic governments 
if an economic crisis is present. However, more work has to be done in order to develop 
a reliable model for explaining the likelihood of technocratic government appointments, 
but this thesis provides a starting point for further developments. The fact that the 
model, as proposed by Pastorella (2014c), only reflects a snapshot of currently carried 
out research highlights two important factors to consider: First, taking into account that 
no other cross-country analyses that focus on the appointment of technocratic 
governments in Europe have been published to this date, the topic provides ample 
opportunities to engage in this evolving discussion. Second, given the “work in 
progress” nature of the model, the assumptions and operationalisations proposed by 
Pastorella (2014c) should be developed further to increase the model’s robustness.  
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